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The direct cost of physicians in the current health care delivery system 
in this country is amazingly small. Physicians take home (in salary and 
other direct compensation) less than 14 percent of the total health care 
dollar. In fact, the direct cost of doctors' paychecks is slightly less than 
the total cost of administrative expenses in hospitals and physician 
offices, and about equal to the average cost of insurance company 
administration. 
In other words, doctors' salaries are not, in themselves, a major part of 
the health care cost problem. However, the critical point to understand 
relative to the cost impact of physicians is that decisions made by 
doctors control over 90 percent of the health care costs in this country. 
Physicians prescribe drugs and determine whether a patient is 
hospitalized. They determine whether a patient is sent to a nursing 
home or treated on an outpatient basis. Doctors determine the 
procedures a given patient will receive and where those procedures will 
be delivered. Physicians determine the scope, complexity, and direction 
of care. Most non-physician care cannot legally be provided without a 
physician's explicit approval and oversight. 
In other words, the role of the physician is central to the issue of health 
care costs, but the direct income received by physicians is · not the 
primary factor that creates today's health care expense level. 
Hypothetically, physicians could be paid twice as much as they receive 
now, and if they were 50 percent more efficient at all of the non-
physician services that they prescribe, the total cost of health care 
would drop by more than 25 percent. 
Given the preceding facts, a couple of key questions emerge: ( 1) What 
is the appropriate role of physicians in the new world of accountable 
health plans and care-system-based health services delivery? (2) If one . 
assumes that health care will be increasingly delivered through teams of 
providers who are prepaid (and therefore, pre-budgeted) for all of the 
care they will provide, what will be the role of the physician on those 
care teams? 
Clearly, the care teams will not be successful unless physicians make 
cost-effective decisions regarding the 90-plus percent of care delivery 
that they control. The prepaid care teams of the mid-1 990s need to be 
structured in ways that enable, encourage, and reward physicians 
relative to the efficiency, cost effectiveness, and quality of their care 
decisions or the care teams will fail. Physicians support for, and 
leadership of, the new care teams will be critical to their success. 
However, the new results-based reimbursement system will represent a 
significant departure from current physician reimbursemen!_approaches, 
in which physicians tend to be rewarded on a piecework basis as 
individual profit centers and not as elements of an overall team of care 
givers. In the current setting, neither the quality nor efficiency of care 
is rewarded. Traditional fee-for-service payment approaches create 
direct financial incentives for physicians to maximize the volume and 
complexity in the care they deliver, whether or not that volume and 
complexity of care has positive results for the patient. There is no 
linkage between either efficiency or quality of the fees that physicians 
are now paid. There are tens of thousands of billing codes in U.S. 
insurance payment approaches for procedures and units of care, but 
there is not one single billing code for a cure! There are no financial 
rewards for positive health care outcomes or improved health. The 
doctor, in fact, usually gets paid more money if patients don't recover 
quickly (because more procedures are needed)then if they do. the profit 
motive clearly has an impact on any economic system, and the 
incentives created by our current fee-for-service health insurance system 
reward and encourage inefficiencies and unnecessary care. 
Physicians tend to be bright, decisive people who base their decisions on 
the best information available to them. They behave like that in their 
practices, and they tend to follow those same behavior patterns in non-
medical areas of their careers and business relationships. Unfortunately, 
the information now readily available to physicians about non-medical, 
health marketplace issues tends to be incomplete and often highly 
distorted. The decisions made by physicians as a result of that 
inaccurate information tend to be somewhat flawed. 
The key to persuading physicians to participate in the most positive way 
in an accountable care system is to give them the most complete, 
candid, and clearly described assessment of the market factors and 
economic constraints that will be affecting them for the rest of this 
decade, along with the best available information about the benefits to 
patient populations of systems-based health care approaches. That 
assessment needs to be entirely honest, fact-based, and real. Issues 
should not be sugar-coated, because decisions made based on falsely 
optimistic beliefs will lead to strategies and relationships that are 
terminally naive and doomed to fail. 
2 
B. 
Also, the credibility of the accountable health plan organizers will suffer 
and their effectiveness will be damaged if the physicians learn or even 
strongly suspect that they have been told less than the full truth about 
the emerging health care marketplace and the benefits and implications 
of systems-based care. The goal of the accountable health plan ought 
to be to create a team of caregivers with commonly aligned incentives, 
objectives, and processes. This can't happen if the team_:_s diagnostic 
foundation is not based on reality, honesty, and a competent assessment 
of the issues. 
When physicians have the facts at hand in trusting patients, they make 
tough, competent, and accurate medical diagnoses. They will do the 
same in their business and care systems relationships when they also 
have sufficient facts to consider. Once they make the same market 
factor diagnosis that the Accountable Health Plan providers have made, 
it's possible to begin to create the kinds of care teams that will be 
successful in the brave, new world of accountable health plans. 
This is not a painless process. Many physicians do not want to 
acknowledge the reality of prepayment and its impact on their incomes 
or autonomy. Many will be angered and "in denial" when they first hear 
the truth. Many will challenge the concepts and the conclusions with 
great vigor. Therefore, it will be critical to accountable health plan 
organizers to put complete facts and irrefutable logic on the table. 
Accountable health plan organizers must make clear their desire to work 
with the doctors to help make their new world as successful as possible. 
In today's fee-for-service environment, cost competition between 
specialty physicians and high-tech care programs doesn't exist because 
insurers and other payers cannot and do not steer patients effectively 
from uncooperative and less efficient specialists to more cooperative 
care sites. Accountable health plans, however, will be in a much better 
position to do exactly that, because the consumers will select the 
accountable health plan and the accountable health plan will select the 
specialists. The accountable health plans will quickly find it in their own 
best interest to send patients to the most efficient and highest quality 
specialists, and they will do so as market pressures on cost force 
accountable health plans to make these decisions in order to remain both 
competitive and financial viable. 
Influencing Factors 
The Medicare program has significantly influenced the behavior of 
physicians since its inception in 1968. A prime example is provision for 
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direct billing of the professional component performed by hospital based 
physicians. This led to long itemized lists of services that were direct 
billed. 
Early attempts to do utilization review (late 1 960' s) focused on profiling 
each specialty to determine those physicians who had a usage factor per 
patient much higher than their peers. Since peer identific2tion was by 
specialty, new knowledge and experience, gained through the use of 
statistical techniques, helped to sharpen the focus on component costs 
of medical care. 
With the advent of price controls and the economic index in the early 
1980' s, further incentives for economic gain turned to use instead of 
price. As HMOs grew, there was a need to focus on the cost (price) of 
components of medical care in order to conduct negotiations with the 
different physician specialties. 
The above discussion is not intended to say that Medicare was the sole 
influence or component management but it was certainly an influence. 
C. Transitioning To The Future 
One way to frame care management capabilities would be to think of a 
continuum beginning with utilization review and going the future where 
disease management seems to be the goal. There are probably goals 
beyond disease management, however, given the rate of advances in 
technology. The use of new data technology which allows more patient 
involvement in care management decisions is an example. It could still 
be called disease management but the patient will certainly be more 
involved in the future. 
II. OUTCOMES RESEARCH AND PROTOCOLS1 
The medical staff of the future must be self-evaluative and constantly 
correcting. As a result, outcomes research will be an important strategic 
activity. Demonstrated desirable outcomes will be required of hospitals by 
third-party payers and patients. The determinative factor will be outcomes 
measures. It will not be enough to rely on status or reputation as substitutes 
for quality. As a result, hospitals will require documented desirable outcomes 
from physicians. 
Outcomes research differs from traditional medical research because it goes 
beyond measuring safety and efficacy to examine such issues as cost 
effectiveness and quality of life. It measures ultimate outcomes of interest 
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from the patient's viewpoint (such as comfort, mobility, and speed of return to 
work) and does not focus solely on traditional clinical measurements or 
intermediate indices of response, such as diagnostic tests. Ultimately, it is a 
collection of scientifically and methodologically sound data for measuring the 
medical effectiveness of different therapeutic interventions. The information 
can then be used for outcomes management to improve the overall health 
status of a patient population over a long period of time (Conrad_ 1991). 
The incentive for clinicians to participate in outcomes management is the 
potential for a marked reduction in unexplained variation and uncertainty. The 
goal "should be to improve patient outcomes by making physician behavior 
more appropriate and based more on evidence and less on habit (Ball 1989)". 
Also, clinicians can serve on a committee that tracks patterns and gives 
feedback on efficiency and effectiveness. 
The guidelines are somewhat controversial, however. There is skepticism 
about mixing scientific and financial thinking. Other obstacles to widespread 
implementation of guidelines include the "moving target" problem, changing 
physician behavior, and potential litigation. The "moving target" problem is a 
product of the speed at which medical practice is advancing. By the time one 
protocol is widely adopted, a new technology or therapy may have displaced 
it. another obstacle is how most effectively to change physician behavior. The 
best way to persuade physicians to follow guidelines is not clear. Also, 
litigation is an issue. Some fear that adoption of guidelines will increase 
physician liability, and decrease autonomy, because physicians will be held 
increasingly responsible if they choose not to follow the guidelines. On the 
other hand, guidelines could also protect physicians from litigation because 
following the guidelines may constitute requisite thoroughness, and thus free 
guideline followers from further responsibility. 
Other incentives that may contribute to physicians' acknowledging outcomes 
research and following guidelines are risk sharing arrangements like the 
proposed Health Care Financing Administration's Ambulatory Visit Groups 
(A VGs). A VGs would function in a similar way to DRGs. They would provide 
one lump sum or an outpatient condition such as congestive heart failure, 
regardless of the number of doctor visits or tests. A similar arrangement might 
be instituted for big-ticket inpatient items as well. The hospital and the 
physicians would receive one sum that would be divided between them. These 
kinds of arrangements could popularize systems professing efficiency and 
effectiveness. In addition, hospitals may have on-line access to the best 
currently available collective wisdom based on medical research by specialized 
firms (Kramon 1991 ). Payers may use this resource, so it might be in the 
physicians' best interests to do so as well. 
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The increasing popularity of guidelines, coupled with the shift of political power 
from providers to payers, may force physicians to incorporate guidelines into 
their practices. The primary care gatekeeper is at risk of becoming a glorified 
technical expert who works on an assembly line of new patients and falling 
prey to what Nash ( 1993) calls the White Coat/Blue Collar syndrome. 
Ill. UTILIZATION REVIEW 
A. Barney Tresnowski2 
Utilization review is a thriving industry with 241 free standing 
companies. By denying coverage for unnecessary surgery, limiting 
hospital stays and trimming use of psychiatric care, these firms have 
helped control the health costs of their clients. But UR will become 
passe as the health system is reformed, Blue Cross Blue Shield 
Association President Bernard Tresnowski claims in an interview with 
F&G's Health Business. 
UR grates on the nerves of doctors, who rankle at having their medical 
decisions second-guessed by the nurses UR firms typically employ. 
Tresnowski says that UR has become too meddlesome and, as insurers 
become more competitive under health reform, they'll look for more 
innovative ways of controlling provider behavior -- including ways that 
aren't as annoying to doctors. 
Tresnowski sees UR giving way to "physician profiling" -- a system the 
Washington, DC Blues Plan began using in 1988. the plan studies health 
claims to gauge a doctor's use of resources to treat a case. Doctors 
who are high or low users of resources are not asked to join the Blues 
network. Those that fall in the middle are chosen and since they meet 
the Blues' criteria up front, they basically will be "left alone" once n the 
network, said Tresnowski. 
Nice theory, but will it work? A DC Blues spokeswoman says that the 
insurer is still using traditional UR methods like pre-admission 
certification because it makes clients more "comfortable." But 
eventually, the plan is to "find the doctors who practice naturally in a 
cost-effective way and let them do their thing," she says. Other Blues 
Plans also are experimenting with the profiling system, and San Mateo-
based lameter is using a physician profiling system to evaluate doctors 




Utilization Management: A Cornerstone of Managed Care3 
This article reviews several utilization review techniques: 
1 . Precertification 
2. Early Discharge Planning 
3. Appropriateness of the Service 
4. Concurrent Review 
5. Retrospective Review 
Case management uses specially trained nurse case managers to follow 
the patient both in the hospital and home setting. Outpatient costs often 
increase as case management succeeds in reducing inpatient costs. 
Another tool used by case managers is prior authorization of outpatient 
services. 
Chart review and physician profiling are also used to determine 
appropriateness of care. Drug utilization profiling and specialist profiling 
are identification techniques for both under and over utilization. Use of 
hospital profiling is also essential. 
Information management tools and techniques are also essential in the 
conduct of utilization management. The medical director is also central 
to the utilization management program. Their primary responsibility is to 
see that utilization management does not compromise quality of medical 
care. 
Growth of the UR lndustry4 
Faulkner & Gray estimates the worth of the UR industry to be $11 
billion. While the industry has experienced rapid growth many are now 
questioning how successful UR has been in reducing health care costs. 
Estimates range from 0.5% to 8%. 
Physicians have always resented being second-guessed and complain 
that UR interferes with their work. To them, it is a lose-lose approach 
to managing patient care. 
UR firms expect workers' compensation to be their biggest growth area 
in the near future. Health costs account for 40% of the workers' 
compensation bill. 
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IV. EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT 
A. Congressional Budget Office5 
First, managed care programs, especially health maintenance 
organizations (HM Os), provide lower-cost health care that appears to be 
generally as good as the care typically provided in the fee-for-service 
(FFS) sector. However, the amount by which HMOs reduce per-patient 
costs compared with FFS care is often overstated. Some studies do not 
adequately control for the typically healthier people who enroll in HMOs 
compared with people in the FFS sector, and so the lower costs of care 
observed for HMOs reflect the favorable characteristics of the enrolled 
population in addition to the cost-reducing effects of the HMO form of 
managed care. Further, some studies rely on results from selected 
HMOs that are more effective than is typical for HMOs nationwide, so 
that reported saving are higher than would be obtained on average for 
all HMOs in operation. Finally, some studies compare costs for HMOs 
with costs in a fee-for-service sector that lacks any managed care; 
because nearly all FFS plans now have some elements of managed care, 
the relative advantage of HMOs compared with the current FFS sector 
is decreasing. 
Recent nationally representative evidence (for 1 989) indicates that the 
most effective HMOs can reduce use of services by about 1 2 percent 
compared with unmanaged care, or by about 9 percent compared with 
the FFS sector, which is a mix of managed and unmanaged care. When · 
the performance of current HMOs (plans with varying levels of 
effectiveness) is considered, evidence indicates that they reduce use of 
services by an average of about 7 percent compared with unmanaged 
care, and by an average of about 4 percent compared with the FFS 
sector. 
The second major finding is that under certain conditions, the 
independent practice association (IPA) form of HMO can be as effective 
as group- or staff-model HMOs in providing low-cost care, but the 
necessary conditions are not often met. The I PAs that are most likely to 
approach the effectiveness of the best group/staff HMOs are selective 
about using cost-conscious providers, maintain an effective network for 
information and control, place providers at financial risk, and generate a 
substantial portion of each provider's patient load. 
Many IPAs in the current mix do not have the above characteristics, 
however, and do not match group/staff HM Os in effectiveness. Recent 
nationally representative evidence indicates that IPAs reduce use of 
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services by an average of about 3 percent compared with unmanaged 
care, or by less than 1 percent compared with the FFS sector. 
Although HMOs appear to reduce the level of health care costs, there is 
no credible evidence that they also reduce the rate at which costs 
subsequently increase. The claim that the rate of growth is lower for 
HMOs than for FFS plans is based on a comparison of growth in 
premiums over the past few years. That evidence, however, is too weak 
to support any conclusion about the relative growth of costs for different 
types of plans. A valid comparison of costs among plans must look at 
total costs, including patients' out-of-pocket costs for services that are 
typically covered. Because slower growth of premiums for HMOs in 
recent years has been at least partly offset by higher growth in HMO 
enrollees' out-of-pocket costs for services, one cannot conclude that 
total costs per HMO enrollee have grown less rapidly than costs per 
enrollee in FFS plans. In fact, total costs per enrollee may have grown 
as rapidly or more rapidly in HMOs than in FFS plans. In the absence of 
reliable data on changes in total costs for HMOs compared with those for 
FFS plans, the prudent assumption to make is that the rate of growth in 
costs is about the same. In any case, a focus on whether or not 
managed care reduces the rate at which health care costs grow 
subsequent to its initial effect on the level of costs is probably 
misplaced, because the two effects are impossible to distinguish 
empirically when insurers are continually adopting new elements of 
managed care. 
Nonetheless, effective forms of managed care might slow the rate of 
growth in costs if they were part of a comprehensive restructuring of the 
health care system that incorporated strong incentives to compete on the 
basis of price and quality. Under such circumstances, managed care 
might more consistently eliminate unnecessary or ineffective care. 
Further, it might facilitate greater control over the adoption of new cost-
increasing technology and might encourage the development of cost-
reducing alternatives. 
B. The AMCRA Foundation6 
Recent concerns about the cost savings potential of managed care have 
had an important influence on health care policy debate and have led 
many to concerns about medical cost in light of budget constraints. 
Several examples of these misconceptions are embodied in recent 
reports produced by the CBO between June, 1992 and July, 1993. For 
example, in the CBO's review of the cost savings literature (CBO 
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1992a), the authors asserted that among health maintenance 
organizations (HM Os), only staff and group models effectively reduce 
costs, while the much more common Independent Practice Associations 
(IPAs) model HMOs are credited with no savings. The CBO further 
asserted that managed care savings have declined over time and 
represent only one-time savings, with costs increasing at roughly the 
same rate as national health care costs. 
These assertions are, however, not supported by the published evidence, 
as the present review demonstrates. The CBO' s literature review on 
managed care savings was highly selective, omitting important recent 
studies and painting an overly negative picture of evidence reviewed. 
The CBO literature review, for example, did not consider seven key 
studies utilized in this report to evaluate managed care savings, all of 
which are well designed, controlled studies. In fact, few of those who 
accept and use the CBO's savings assumptions realize that the CBO's 
estimate of HMO savings (staff and group model HMOs, only) were 
based exclusively on one study, the Rand Health Insurance Experiment. 
An excellent study, the Rand Health Insurance Experiment is, however, 
out of date, and based on the experience of only one HMO. When more 
recent evidence is considered, it is clear that the CBO' s picture of 
managed care savings is outdated and inaccurate. Unfortunately, the 
CBO' s assertions have proven to be particularly influential because of the 
CBO's direct involvement in the budget process and the CBO's general 
reputation for impartial analysis. 
By giving stronger weight to studies of recent vintage that controlled for 
the possibility of selection bias, this literature review reveals a very 
different picture of managed care savings than that of the CBO. In this 
report HMOs are shown to have a large and consistent impact on health 
care costs and utilization, mainly through substantial reductions in both 
admissions and length of stay, while, as expected, ambulatory utilization 
generally increased. The net effect is a strong reduction in overall costs. 
Further, contrary to the CBO's contention, there is no evidence that 
HMO savings differ substantially by model type. Substantial IPA model 
savings were demonstrated through a variety of high quality studies. In 
a Medicare study that directly compared savings by model type, staff 
model HMOs utilized more resources than IPA and group model HMOs 
for physician services, nursing home days, and home health visits. Only 
in the utilization of skilled nursing facilities relative to group model HM Os 
did IPA model HMOs have higher utilization. 
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There is less certainty regarding the specific magnitudes of HMO 
savings, as it is difficult to quantify general savings rates from the many 
bits of evidence available. However, taken as a whole, the results show 
substantially higher savings rates than the CBO's reviews would 
suggest. The present review concludes that, on average, HMOs achieve 
savings of 27. 1 % beyond traditional fee-for-service plans. This average 
savings rate is based on component savings ranging from decreases in 
hospital admissions of 34% and hospital length of stay of 16%, to 
increases in ambulatory primary care physician utilization of 3.3%. The 
increase in physician utilization is the result of financial incentives to the 
HMO patient to increase primary and preventive care visits, as well as 
the result of provider decisions involving the substitution of less 
expensive ambulatory care for more expensive modes of care. The net 
effect of the inpatient and outpatient impacts is a substantial decrease 
in costs. 
On the other hand, preferred provider organizations (PPOs) cannot be 
shown to achieve significant savings. Individual studies demonstrated 
both savings and cost increases for PPOs. There is anecdotal evidence 
that the more advanced PPOs--those that resemble IPA HMOs in certain 
features--are probably able to exert a significant measure of cost control. 
However, the absence of evidence regarding the relative predominance 
of these plans, and the lack of consistent savings evidence from 
controlled studies makes it impossible for this review to credit PPOs with 
savings. This analysis, however, only considers utilization effects of 
these plans and ignores the impact of discounts, which may result in 
substantial savings. 
While the results for point of service (POS) plans are less conclusive, the 
one available study suggests that these forms of managed care, which 
share certain features of both HMOs and PPOs, can also be effective. 
POS plans are presumed to achieve an average savings rate of 13.2%. 
For the population not yet enrolled in HMOs, there is an additional, or 
net, reduction in national health expenditures of $81.4 billion. In other 
words, savings in addition to those already being achieved for those 
enrolled in some form of managed care. This represents a net savings 
of 12.2%, and a reduction in national health expenditures as a percent . 
of GDP from 12.1 % to 10.6%. When the CBO, in its August 1992 
report, identified national savings of 9.6%, it relied on the erroneous 
assumption that IPA model HMOs and POS plans did not save money. 
This increased their savings result, since by excluding savings for those 
currently in IPAs and POS plans, they netted out less current savings. 
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For comparison purposes, adopting this same assumption for the present 
calculations increases the savings in national health expenditures to 
13.6%. 
These calculations, however, are not intended as "projections" of the 
savings that can be achieved under any specific reform proposal. The 
reason is that these calculations are far too conservative in their practical 
assumptions regarding potential savings. The savings that can actually 
be achieved may far exceed those presented here. This analysis does 
not incorporate many of the fundamental market changes that could 
dramatically increase the effectiveness of managed care, such as 
reducing or eliminating cost-shifting, shadow pricing, or selection bias, 
or providing market environments in which managed care plans are 
forced to compete vigorously. In addition, this entire analysis excludes 
consideration of discounts, which could be expected to have a 
substantial impact on national health expenditures. 
The main value of extending the savings rates to the national health 
accounts is to provide a baseline, or minimum, level of national savings 
that results from applying the savings rates derived from the literature to 
the nation as a whole. It also helps to illustrate the degree of bias in the 
CBO model. Even using stringently conservative assumptions, these 
calculations result in larger savings than the CBO' s model. 
In addition to single-year savings, this study also calculated the long 
term savings that would result from a reduction in the health care cost 
trend. The calculation is based on an assumed 11 % reduction in the 
health care cost trend. This reduction is based on the differential 
between HMO and fee-for-service premium growth rates derived from 
employer surveys conducted by the Health Insurance Association of 
American (HIAA) and KPMG Peat Marwick. This modest reduction in the 
cost trend results in savings of 16.5% by the year 2000 and 22.6% by 
the year 2010 (using 1995 as the base year). These represent 
reductions in national health expenditures as a percent of GDP from 
18.1 % (based on HCFA projections) to 15.5% of GDP in the year 2000, 
and from 22.6% to 17.9% of GDP in 2010. 
Even under these conservative assumptions, managed care could exert 
significant control on health expenditures well into the future. Using 
these assumptions, projected health expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP in the year 2000 (15.5%) would be just under HCFA's projections 
at the current trend for 1995 (15.6%). 
12 
This evidence suggests that researchers must be willing to challenge old 
assumptions regarding managed care and that substantial new research 
is needed to update our current understanding of managed care, 
especially as the distinctions among the various types of managed care 
organizations become increasingly blurred. Future research efforts 
should focus on understanding the managed care mechanisms that work, 
and on what combinations are most effective, rather than o_n the savings 
associated with discreet organizational forms of managed care. 
The most immediate and critical implication of this report, however, is 
that the CBO, Congress, the Administration, and the health care policy 
community must give serious reconsideration to the fundamental 
assumptions about the managed care savings that are at the heart of the 
analyses and projections guiding the imminent, fundamental redesign of 
the U.S. health care system. 
V. SUMMARY OF COMPONENT MANAGEMENT7 
APPROACH 
• Break out health care costs by component (e.g., hospital, drugs, 
physician) 
• Manage price and volume for each 
MECHANISMS 
Achieve price discounts through volume 
• Measure price and quality through benchmarking 
• Negotiate contracts on volume and price discount links 
• Direct patient flow 
Reduce utilization where unnecessary through utilization review (UR) 
• Establish acceptable norms (e.g., drug formulary, treatment protocols, 
preadmission certification guidelines) 
• Measure deviations from norms 
• Create feedback and accountability, (e.g., deny unnecessary surgeries, 
limit hospital stays, trim psychiatric care) 
• Can take the form of prospective review (precertification), concurrent 
review, and retrospective review 
KEY ENABLING CAPABILITY 
• Information management capabilities - accurate claims dataf information 
technology infrastructure, solid data management and analysis 
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TRENDS 
UR business has grown and most likely will continue to grow rapidly 
• Estimated > 240 freestanding companies provide UR services to 
estimated 770 companies 
• UR industry revenues grew 52% from $19M in 1990 to $39M in 1992 
• Cost savings achieved estimated up to 8 % of health care costs 
Diversification drives this growth 
• Blurring of definitions between UR and other aspects of managed care. 
Example of diversification include management of data on cost, quality 
and utilization, worker's compensation, mental health services, and 
research 
• Pharmacy benefit management carve-outs, mental health management 
are experiencing significant activity 
"Traditional" UR increasingly in disfavor 
• Creates adversarial physician relationship as UR "second guesses" 
diagnoses 
• "Traditional UR becoming passe", Bernard Tresnowski, President, BCBS 
Association 
• Some criticism that UR does not look at the entire spectrum of care 
during a patient's illness. Minimizing the cost of one component of care 
may increase the cost of another component of care. One example, 
reducing pharmaceutical cost may cause increase in hospital length of 
stay. 
Alternatives to UR are being discussed throughout the industry 
• Physician profiling - to measure a physician's use of resources in order 
to evaluate participation/inclusion in a network or to evaluate 
performance 
• Disease management - evaluate health care cost across treatment for a 
disease instead of by component of care. Some traditional UR 
companies are exploring disease management opportunities as they 
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